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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Dwayne Thompson (“Appellant” or “Thompson”) 
appeals the District Court’s judgment entered on March 18, 
2013.  Thompson argues that the District Court erred in 
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failing to suppress (a) the fruits of a search which, he 
contends, law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to 
conduct, and (b) statements he made while in custody, prior 
to being presented to a magistrate judge.  Thompson claims 
that such statements violated the McNabb-Mallory rule.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the 
search, but we will reverse the District Court’s suppression 
ruling regarding Thompson’s statements.  Accordingly, we 
will vacate and remand Thompson’s judgment of conviction.      
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 From 2001 until July 2007, Dwayne Thompson was 
the supplier for a cocaine distribution network known as the 
“Cali Connect.”  The Cali Connect shipped cocaine to the 
East Coast where it was distributed, including in and around 
the Pittsburgh area.  Thompson transported cocaine from 
California to Pittsburgh either in one of his own vehicles or in 
rentals cars.  After completing his deliveries, Thompson 
would wait for the money before returning to California, or 
receive payment on his next trip to the area.   
 Investigators became aware of Thompson through 
their cooperating witnesses and a wiretap investigation.  
Several cooperating witnesses named Thompson as the source 
for the Cali Connect’s cocaine.  In wiretapped phone 
conversations with other targets, Thompson made comments 
that investigators interpreted to be drug-related.   
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 A.  The Traffic Stop 
 On June 29, 2007, Thompson was involved in a traffic 
stop near Amarillo, Texas.  Trooper Livermore of the Texas 
Department of Public Safety was “running traffic” on I-40 
near Amarillo, Texas, along with his partner, Chad Grange.  
Within the law enforcement community, I-40 is a “known 
corridor for narcotics, weapons, and money.”  (App. 508.)  
Shortly before 1:40 p.m., Livermore saw a maroon pickup 
truck, with a hard-top cover on the bed, traveling eastbound at 
a speed of 84 mph in a 70 mph zone.  It is illegal under Texas 
law to travel in excess of a posted speed limit.  Livermore 
stopped the truck and approached the passenger’s side 
window.  Thompson was the sole occupant of the pickup 
truck. 
 Livermore spoke with Thompson and advised him of 
the reason for the stop.  Livermore asked Thompson where he 
was going.  Thompson replied that he was en route to 
Indianapolis and that he would be staying there for 
approximately three weeks.  Livermore observed that 
Thompson only had one suitcase for such a long trip, and it 
raised his suspicions.  Livermore said, “I didn’t think it was 
the norm to have that size luggage for the length of the trip.”  
(App. 516.)   
 Livermore also claimed that Thompson appeared 
nervous: he did not make eye contact, his voice was shaky, 
and a vein in the side of his neck was pulsing.  Thompson’s 
signs of nervousness, in conjunction with the small suitcase, 
the fact that I-40 is a known drug corridor, and knowledge 
that California is a “source” state, aroused Livermore’s 
suspicions that this trip was a drug-trafficking trip.   
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 Livermore went back to the patrol car and ran 
Thompson’s criminal history.  The criminal history check 
showed several dated narcotics offenses, and a more recent 
prior conviction for a firearm offense.  When Livermore 
asked Thompson – still in the car – about his criminal history, 
Thompson disclosed only the firearm conviction.   
 Livermore began to write up the citation for the 
speeding ticket and asked Thompson if he could search the 
vehicle.  Thompson said that he could not.  At this point, 
Livermore consulted with Sergeant Grange, and they decided 
to call for a K-9 detection team.   
 The K-9 unit was contacted at 1:50 p.m., eleven 
minutes after the initial stop.  The officers were notified at 
1:52 p.m. that the K-9 unit was en route.  It took the K-9 unit 
approximately thirty minutes to arrive at the scene.  Prior to 
the K-9 search, Thompson agreed to accept responsibility for 
anything that might be discovered in the truck.   
 When the K-9 unit arrived at the scene, the dog alerted 
after his first pass by scratching at the back of the pickup 
truck.  The officers then searched the vehicle and opened the 
locked truck-bed using a key provided by Thompson.  When 
they opened it, they immediately smelled marijuana.  Beneath 
a tarp lay five large, plastic tubs containing marijuana.   
 Thompson was arrested and transported to the Texas 
Highway Patrol’s district office.  Officers spoke with 
investigators regarding the Cali Connect, who informed them 
that they should check the back tailgate area, as that is where 
Thompson had been observed to keep narcotics.  The troopers 
searched the area and found six kilograms of cocaine.  
Thompson was charged locally for the marijuana found in the 
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vehicle.  He posted bond, was released, and was not informed 
about the discovery of cocaine.     
  B.  Failure to Timely Present  
 A few weeks later, a Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) task force executed a series of 
search warrants on residences believed to be associated with 
Cali Connect members, including Thompson, in 
Pennsylvania, Indiana, and California.  The task force 
members executed a search warrant on Thompson’s home at 
7:00 a.m., on July 17, 2007.   
 Thompson was found in an upstairs bedroom, on the 
phone.  He was taken outside to a patrol car briefly, then 
returned inside where DEA Agent Strobel read Thompson his 
Miranda rights.  No separate, written Miranda waiver was 
signed at that time, or later.  Thompson sat at a table in 
handcuffs, surrounded by uniformed officers, while the search 
was conducted.  During the search, the officers played 
wiretap recordings of Thompson and others involved in Cali 
Connect, obtained while investigating the group.  Thompson 
remained there until the search concluded at 9:40 a.m.  
Investigators recovered two kilograms of cocaine from the 
search.   
 At the conclusion of the search, agents drove 
Thompson to the DEA field office in Los Angeles (“L.A.”) 
for processing.  Due to the distance, traffic, and a pit-stop for 
fast food, the drive took approximately an hour and a half.  
Officers did not question Thompson during the ride, but did 
“lay[] the case out for him.”  (App. 677.)  Agent Strobel also 
informed Thompson about the value of cooperation. 
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 They arrived at the DEA office shortly after 11:00 
a.m., when Thompson was processed and placed in a holding 
room. Processing takes approximately twenty minutes, and it 
is DEA policy to process prisoners before taking them to 
court for their initial appearances.  In the early afternoon, 
Agent Strobel asked Thompson “what he wanted to do[.]” 
(App. 680).  Thompson informed the officer that he wanted to 
cooperate.  At that time, more than six hours had passed since 
his arrest at approximately 7:00 a.m.   
 At this point, Agent Strobel and another DEA Agent, 
Christopher Balchon, began interviewing Thompson.  Over 
the course of the afternoon, Thompson offered information 
about his cocaine sources in the L.A. area and about his co-
conspirators.  In addition, they had Thompson place a series 
of phone calls in an effort to solicit a “reverse buy-bust” on 
one of the alleged co-conspirators.   
 Agent Balchon did not present Thompson with a 
written waiver of his right to prompt presentment until 6:38 
p.m., nearly twelve hours after his arrest.  Thompson was 
advised at this point about his right to a speedy appearance, 
and re-advised of his right to remain silent and his right to 
counsel.  Thompson signed the form.  Thompson then 
requested that the interview cease, and he was taken to 
Metropolitan Correctional Center to spend the night.   
 Thompson continued to cooperate the next day, but it 
became clear that Thompson would be unable to arrange the 
“buy-bust,” and the effort was abandoned.  The agents 
returned him to Metropolitan Correctional Center and 
delivered him for presentment the next morning.  Thompson 
was presented nearly 48 hours after his initial arrest. 
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 C.  Procedural Posture 
 Following the denial of several motions to suppress, 
Thompson pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 
five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
846, and one count of conspiracy to launder monetary 
instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).  As part of 
the plea, Thompson preserved the right to appeal several 
adverse suppression rulings, including those at issue in this 
appeal: (1) the denial of the motion to suppress evidence 
seized in the Texas traffic stop; and (2) the denial of the 
motion to suppress statements obtained following the 
execution of search warrants at his home and various other 
locations.   
 Thompson was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
for 292 months and five years of supervised release on the 
drug conspiracy count; a term of imprisonment for 240 
months and three years of supervised release on the money 
laundering count, to run concurrently; and a $200 special 
assessment.    
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
to review the District Court’s judgment of conviction.  “We 
review a district court’s order denying a motion to suppress 
under a mixed standard of review.  We review findings of fact 
for clear error, but we exercise plenary review over legal 
determinations.”  United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236-
37 (3d Cir. 2012) 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Extend the 
Traffic Stop 
 Thompson first contends that the troopers who were 
involved in the traffic stop lacked articulable suspicion that 
would justify the extension of their traffic stop to include a K-
9 search.   
 “After a traffic stop that was justified at its inception, 
an officer who develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity may expand the scope of an inquiry beyond 
the reason for the stop and detain the vehicle and its 
occupants for further investigation.”  United States v. Givan, 
320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003).  An inchoate hunch does 
not satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion; rather, the 
Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement have 
“some minimal level of objective justification for making the 
stop.”  United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) 
(quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be 
justified by some objective manifestation that the person 
stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”).  
This level of suspicion is “less than proof of wrongdoing by a 
preponderance of the evidence [and] . . . less demanding than 
that for probable cause.”  Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (internal 
citations omitted).   
 “In determining whether there was a basis for 
reasonable suspicion, a court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances, in light of the officer’s experience.”  Givan, 
320 F.3d at 458; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
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266, 273 (2002) (“When discussing how reviewing courts 
should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have 
said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining 
officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for 
suspecting legal wrongdoing.”) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 
417-18). 
 The Supreme Court has stressed that the totality of the 
circumstances standard enables “officers to draw on their own 
experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them that might well elude an untrained person.”  Arvizu, 534 
U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Further, while “the individual 
factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion may be innocent in 
isolation, together they must serve to eliminate a substantial 
portion of innocent travelers.”  United States v. Mathurin, 561 
F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 
F.3d 485, 493 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, courts are not permitted to analyze factors 
individually, as innocent factors taken together may appear 
suspicious to an experienced officer.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 22-23 (1968).    
 The parties agree that Trooper Livermore’s initial 
justification for the stop was lawful because Thompson was 
driving 84 miles per hour in a 70 miles per hour zone.1  “A 
                                                 
 1 “A speed in excess of the limits established by 
Subsection (b) . . . is prima facie evidence that the speed is 
not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful.”  
Tex. Transportation Code Ann. § 545.352 (West 2011).   
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police officer who observes a violation of state traffic laws 
may lawfully stop the car committing the violation.”  United 
States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)).   Thus, 
the only question before us is whether Livermore had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the stop to include 
a K-9 search.   
 At the time of the stop, Livermore had been involved 
in approximately 1500 traffic stops both as a state trooper and 
as a member of a local police department.  Ten of the stops 
involved felonious amounts of contraband and thirty 
misdemeanor arrests, all along the corridor Thompson was 
stopped on.  Livermore was trained to recognize indicators of 
drug smuggling and other criminal activities at the training 
academy and on the job.  
 Livermore testified that Thompson’s explanation about 
the length of his trip and the amount of luggage was 
suspicious.  Livermore noted that the amount of luggage 
appeared to be inconsistent with the stated length of the trip.  
Livermore also observed Thompson’s behavior and physical 
characteristics as additional indicators of suspicious activity.  
Thompson was visibly nervous, with a shaky voice and a vein 
on his neck pulsating rapidly.  His answers to questions came 
out hesitatingly, and he neglected to mention his prior 
involvement with controlled substances or narcotics when 
questioned by Livermore.   
 Based upon Livermore’s testimony and experience, the 
District Court concluded that he possessed a “reasonable 
articulable suspicion in terms of articulating his basis for 
those suspicions.”  (App. 618.)  The Court determined that, 
based on the “totality of the circumstances, viewing the 
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officer’s experience and training, that the investigatory stop 
was appropriate and under the Fourth Amendment was more 
than an inchoate hunch.”  (Id. at 619.)   
 Thompson, in arguing that the District Court erred in 
finding that Livermore had reasonable articulable suspicion, 
relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Georgia, 
448 U.S. 438 (1980).  In Reid, a DEA agent observed Reid 
looking back in the direction of a second man, who possessed 
a matching shoulder bag.  The agent stated that when he 
approached them, both men appeared to be nervous.  The 
Court found that the evidence relied on in this case would 
“describe a very large category of presumably innocent 
travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures 
were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there 
was in this case could justify a seizure.”  Reid, 448 U.S. at 
441.  The Supreme Court further held that the agent’s 
suspicion that “[Reid] and his companion were attempting to 
conceal the fact that they were traveling together . . . was 
more an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, 
than a fair inference in the light of his experience, [and was] 
simply too slender a reed to support the seizure in this case.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 Unlike in Reid, Thompson’s behavior, when examined 
in totality, serves to “eliminate a substantial portion of 
innocent travelers.”  Mathurin, 561 F.3d at 174 (quoting 
Karnes, 62 F.3d at 493) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
During Livermore’s stop of Thompson, there were many 
factors that piqued the officer’s suspicion, not simply 
nervousness and glances.  Accordingly, it was reasonable for 
Livermore to infer, based upon his experience as a state 
trooper and as a member of the local police, that Thompson 
was engaged in illegal activity.   
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 In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we 
agree with the District Court that Livermore had a 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” to believe that Thompson 
was engaged in an illegal activity, and to extend Thompson’s 
traffic stop to include a K-9 search.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s denial of Thompson’s motion to suppress 
relating to the traffic stop on June 29, 2007. 
B.  The McNabb-Mallory Rule  
 Thompson next argues that certain statements he made 
on July 17, 2007 – specifically, his confession – should be 
suppressed on the basis that his interrogation violated his 
right to prompt presentment.   
 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that a 
defendant who has been arrested within the United States be 
brought “without unnecessary delay before a magistrate 
judge.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A).  In a series of cases, the 
Supreme Court gave teeth to this rule by requiring the 
exclusion of any confessions obtained during an unreasonable 
period of detention that violated the prompt presentment 
requirement.  See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 
(1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); see 
also Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 322 (2009) 
(confirming that even voluntary confessions should be 
suppressed if they occurred during a period of unreasonable 
delay).  The right to speedy presentment not only checks the 
likelihood of coercive questioning, but also avoids “all the 
evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of 
crime.”  Corley, 556 U.S. at 307 (quoting McNabb, 318 U.S. 
at 344).   Presentment is the “point at which the judge is 
required to take several key steps to foreclose Government 
overreaching: informing the defendant of the charges against 
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him, his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, the 
availability of bail, and any right to a preliminary hearing; 
giving the defendant a chance to consult with counsel; and 
deciding between detention or release.”  Corley, 556 U.S. at 
320.   
 Following the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule, Congress enacted 18 
U.S.C. § 3501 in order to create a safe harbor period for 
certain voluntary confessions.  See Corley, 556 U.S. at 309-10 
(discussing legislative history and intent of § 3501).  With 
respect to Rule 5(a)’s requirement of speedy presentment, § 
3501(c) provides that “a confession . . . shall not be 
inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person 
before a magistrate judge . . . if such confession was made or 
given by such person within six hours immediately following 
his arrest or other detention.”  18 U.S.C. § 3501(c).  The 
section further provides that its six-hour cut-off “shall not 
apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person 
before such magistrate judge . . . is found by the trial judge to 
be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the 
distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate 
judge.”  Id.  
 The reasonableness standard under the McNabb-
Mallory rule focuses primarily on whether the delay was for 
the purpose of interrogation.  See Corley, 556 U.S. at 308 
(“[D]elay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of 
unnecessary delay.”) (quoting Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455-56) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Simply put, a delay in 
presentment of a defendant before a magistrate judge is 
unreasonable and unnecessary when it is “of a nature to give 
opportunity for the extraction of a confession.”  Mallory, 354 
U.S. at 455.    
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 In order to determine whether a McNabb-Mallory 
violation occurred, we must first determine whether voluntary 
statements were received either within six hours of a 
defendant’s detention, or within a longer period deemed 
reasonable in light of travel or transportation difficulties.   If 
they were, the statements occurred within the safe-harbor 
period, and no exclusion is required.  Corley, 556 U.S. at 322 
(“If the confession came within that period, it is admissible . . 
. .”).   
 Next, where a voluntary confession falls beyond the 
safe-harbor period, § 3501(c) then requires a court to 
determine whether the delay was nevertheless reasonable or 
necessary under the McNabb-Mallory rule.  See id. (“If the 
confession occurred before presentment and beyond six 
hours, however, the court must decide whether delaying that 
long was unreasonable or unnecessary under the McNabb-
Mallory cases, and if it was, the confession is to be 
suppressed.”); United States v. McDowell, 687 F.3d 904, 909 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“A confession given outside the six-hour 
period is also admissible under § 3501(c) if the court finds the 
confession was voluntary and the delay in presentment was 
reasonable.”) (emphasis in original).   
 A delay may be reasonable if caused by administrative 
concerns, such as the unavailability of a magistrate following 
an arrest, see, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 569 
F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009), or by a shortage of 
personnel, id.; United States v. Boche-Perez, 755 F.3d 327, 
336-38 (5th Cir. 2014).  In addition, de minimis delays past 
the six-hour limitation may not necessarily raise procedural 
concerns.  See United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 814-15 
(1st Cir. 2014) (one minute outside the six-hour limit found to 
be a minor and ultimately harmless miscalculation of time).   
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 A delay “is unreasonable and unnecessary when it is 
‘of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a 
confession.’” Garcia-Hernandez, 569 F.3d at 1106 (quoting 
Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455).  A delay caused by law 
enforcement’s “desire to investigate other crimes is not a 
legitimate excuse for their failure to respect . . . [the] right to 
a prompt arraignment.”  United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 
1026, 1035-36 (2d Cir. 1984); see also id. (government failed 
to provide any evidence for why delay was necessary, when a 
magistrate judge was available nearby after the defendant had 
been processed and there were six agents assigned to the 
case).  Additionally, a delay is unreasonable where the record 
clearly shows that agents “continued with their interrogation, 
despite Miranda and Rule 5, fully aware of the sanction of 
exclusion yet willing to incur it, ostensibly in the name of a 
greater good.”  United States v. Helmandollar, 852 F.2d 498, 
501 (9th Cir. 1988); see also id. (defendant held for more than 
28 hours before presentment and questioned by multiple 
agents continuously, despite seeking to assert right to counsel 
on numerous occasions).  Moreover, unexplained delays, 
despite being in close proximity to an available judge, can be 
considered unreasonable.  United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 
1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1988) (no reasonable excuse for no 
arraignment because the arraignments were held within the 
same building where Wilson was held).  
 Here, it is undisputed that Thompson’s confession 
came considerably after the six-hour period had run.  As a 
result, the question before us is whether the delay in his 
presentment was unreasonable or unnecessary under the 
McNabb-Mallory cases.    
 Thompson contends that, because his waiver was 
untimely under § 3501(c), his subsequent confession is 
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inadmissible under McNabb-Mallory.  Specifically, 
Thompson insists that the delay cannot be deemed 
“reasonable” because it was unnecessary, as Thompson was 
arrested in relative proximity to the federal courthouse and 
before the business day had commenced.  Agents had the 
opportunity to bring him before the court for at least one and 
possibly two arraignment dockets or seek a waiver of 
presentment, but simply chose not to do so, in order to pursue 
his cooperation.  (Appellant’s Br. 37). 
 On the other hand, the government contends that the 
delay in Thompson’s presentment was reasonable because the 
delay was not for the purpose of interrogation.  In addition to 
the delays caused by: (1) the search of Thompson’s residence; 
(2) the time spent in transporting Thompson to the DEA 
office and providing him with food; (3) processing Thompson 
at the DEA office; and (4) the missed opportunity to bring 
Thompson to the morning docket the day of his arrest, the 
government asks this Court to find that pursuit of cooperation 
is a reasonable delay.  The government contends that pursuit 
of cooperation is particularly distinguishable from pursuit of 
confession in this case because “Thompson’s confession was 
superfluous to [the] issue of his guilt.”  (Appellee’s Br. 38).   
 We find that the government’s arguments do not hold 
water.  Thompson signed a waiver of his right to prompt 
presentment approximately 12 hours after his arrest.  He was 
ultimately presented 48 hours after his arrest.  The traditional 
exceptions to the McNabb-Mallory rule focus on the practical 
obstacles to getting to a magistrate.  See, e.g., Garcia-
Hernandez, 569 F.3d at 1106 (administrative delays are 
reasonable and necessary).  Certainly, some of the obstacles 
to the delay were logistical.  “[L]aw enforcement personnel 
are permitted, within reasonable limits, to investigate whether 
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the crime occurred; search and secure a premises; and secure, 
confiscate, or destroy contraband before taking an arrestee to 
a magistrate.”  Boche-Perez, 755 F.3d at 337.   
 Here, two and a half hours were spent searching and 
securing the premises, as well as confiscating contraband 
before Thompson was taken to a magistrate.  Thus, this part 
of the delay is reasonable.  In addition, law enforcement 
testified that part of the delay was due to transportation.  The 
rule itself makes clear that transportation-based delays are 
reasonable.  18 U.S.C. §3501(c).  The government also claims 
that by the time Thompson arrived to the DEA offices, the 
morning arraignment docket was unavailable to them.  
Accepting this as true, this delay would be considered 
reasonable as well.  A magistrate can be considered 
unavailable due to a host of reasons, including a full docket.  
See Boche-Perez, 755 F.3d at 338.  
 However, while some of the obstacles to the delay 
were reasonable, as the government notes, “[t]he 
overwhelming bulk of the delay in this case was devoted to 
giving Thompson the opportunity to cooperate and was 
therefore reasonable.”  (Appellee’s Br. 42.)  We are unwilling 
to hold that “pursuit of cooperation” may constitute a basis 
for delay in presentment.  Drawing a line between pursuit of 
cooperation and the extraction of a confession is untenable 
without looking at the subjective intent of the officers.  It is 
almost inevitable that the pursuit of cooperation will lead to a 
confession by way of interrogation.  “Few criminals feel 
impelled to confess to the police purely of their own accord, 
without any questioning at all.”  Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 
598, 604 (3d Cir. 1986).  As a supervising court, it is nearly 
impossible to separate the pursuit of cooperation from the 
most unreasonable excuse: interrogation.   
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 Thus, we must hold that pursuit of cooperation is not a 
reasonable excuse for delay in presentment.  Were we to hold 
otherwise, the resulting imprecision would lead to confusion 
on where to draw the line between engagement based on a 
mutual desire to cooperate, versus law enforcement’s desire 
to interrogate, with the hope that cooperation may result.  
Additionally, we would be required to make a credibility 
determination regarding whether law enforcement was 
legitimately representing that their pursuit of cooperation was 
done in earnest.  Such an outcome would undermine Corley’s 
affirmation of the McNabb-Mallory rule, by making the 
inquiry turn on the subjective intent of the officers rather than 
the objectively verifiable and logistical causes of delay 
permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c).  See Corley, 556 U.S. 
at 322 (“We hold that § 3501 modified McNabb-Mallory 
without supplanting it.”).   
 In addition to not finding pursuit of cooperation as a 
reasonable excuse to delay, the logistical components of 
Thompson’s delay account for only a portion of the time 
before he agreed to cooperate fifteen to thirty minutes after 
the six-hour time period elapsed, or before he was presented 
with a waiver at 12 hours, or presented to a magistrate judge 
nearly 48 hours after being arrested.  The government 
presented no evidence as to the unavailability of the afternoon 
docket, nor why Thompson had to be processed at the DEA 
prior to presentment.  Further, the government did not explain 
why Thompson was not presented with a waiver within the 
six hour constraint, which would have permitted the 
government to pursue Thompson’s cooperation.  Our opinion 
does not impede law enforcement’s legitimate desire and 
effort to seek out cooperation.   
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 The purpose of the McNabb-Mallory rule is not merely 
to “avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of 
persons accused of crime.”  McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344.  
Rather, the rule was also designed to ensure that a defendant 
is brought “before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so 
that he may be advised of his rights.”  Mallory, 354 U.S. at 
454.  The government was required to present Thompson to a 
magistrate as quickly as possible.  Instead, the government 
delayed Thompson’s arraignment so that they could continue 
to persuade him to cooperate.  The longer a defendant goes 
without being apprised of his rights, the more vulnerable he 
is.  “In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents 
would be free to question suspects for extended periods 
before bringing them out in the open, and we have always 
known what custodial secrecy leads to . . . [C]ustodial police 
interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the 
individual, . . . and there is mounting empirical evidence that 
these pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of 
people to confess to crimes they never committed . . . .”  
Corley, 556 U.S. at 320-21 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Because we are unpersuaded by the 
government’s argument that the delay in presentment was 
reasonable, we will reverse the District Court’s denial of 
Thompson’s motion to suppress his statements.   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the District Court’s ruling denying the 
motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the traffic 
stop on June 29, 2007.  We will reverse the District Court’s 
ruling denying the motion to suppress the statements made in 
violation of the McNabb-Mallory rule and Fed. R. Crim. P. 
5(a)(1)(A) from July 17, 2007.  In this case, the delay of 
presentment was not reasonable, and accordingly, 
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Thompson’s statements should have been suppressed.  We 
therefore vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the 
case to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
